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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The social security earnings test reduces a 65-69-year-old's benefits at a
33-percent rate and a 62-64 year-old's benefits at a 50-percent rate once
earnings pass a threshold amountamong the highest marginal tax
rates in the economy. Previous research dismissed the importance of the
earnings test but failed to take advantage of three more recent changes
in the earnings-test rules, each applying to some age groups and not
others, in order to identify its impact. Data on earnings distributions
before and after these rules changes demonstrate that a significant num-
ber of older workers are clustered with earnings just at or below the
earnings-exempt amountso the earnings test leads some beneficiaries
to hold down their labor supply. Furthermore, the bunching moves
when the exempt amount moves and disappears when the earnings test
is eliminated. An econometric model of labor supply is also formulated
to incorporate the entire range of beneficiaries' responses to the earnings
test. The resulting estimates imply substantial deadweight loss from
older workers changing their labor supply to avoid taxation. Simulations
predict a 5.3-percent boost to aggregate labor supply from eliminating
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the earnings test, and at a minimal fiscal cost. In contrast, a slight de-
crease in labor supply is predicted from the recently legislated increase
in the exempt amount. It wifi be important to keep in mind this apparent
sensitivity of older workers to tax and transfer rules conditional on work-
ing, which will affect the outcome of policies that attempt to induce
people to work longer. Another important consideration involves 62-64-
year-olds, who face an earnings test as restrictive as it was in the mid-
1970s. The tighter earnings test rules wifi be extended to 65- and 66-year-
olds as the normal retirement age is raised.
1. INTRODUCTION
With the life expectancy of those who reach old age having risen substan-
tially and with the elderly continuing to grow as a percentage of the
population, their economic well-being has been a major policy focus in
recent decades. Social security has been key in increasing the income of
the elderly both in absolute terms and relative to other groups of the
population. When it was established during the Great Depression, one
motive for social security was to encourage older workers to leave the
labor force and make way for younger workers.1 This was accomplished
not simply by giving benefits to older workers, but also by conditioning
benefits on a reduction in earnings. The earnings test took away an
entire month's benefits when monthly earnings exceeded $15. With me-
dian monthly wage and salary income at $73 in 1940, the earnings test in
effect tied benefit eligibility to retirement.
In the decades since social security was established, labor-force partici-
pation among older workers has plummeted. After a slow decline since
the late 1800s, the participation rate of men aged 65 and over fell from
41.8 percent in 1940 to 19.3 percent in 1980.2 With life expectancy continu-
ing to rise, the work force shrinking, and savings rates at an all-time low,
the increasing length of retirement has come to be viewed as unsustain-
able. One consequence is the fiscal drain on the social security system,
which is projected to be insolvent by around 2030. The policy focus in
turn has shifted to encouraging the aged to be more reliant on their own
resources by working longer and saving more.
To ease the penalty against working, the earnings test was gradually
1Quadagno (1988), Graebner (1980).
2Data from the U.S. Census. During the 1930s the labor-force participation rate also
dropped considerably, probably several percentage points. However, measuring participa-
tion rates before 1940 is problematic because earlier census questions did not ask about
participation. See Ransom and Sutch (1988).The Earnings Test and Labor Supply123
liberalized beginning in the 1950s. The exempt amount has been raised
and the implicit tax on earnings lowered, principally for those aged 65
and over. In 1996 a beneficiary aged 65-69 earning more than $12,500
lost $1 in benefits for every $3 in additional earningswhich functions
as a 33% tax on wages. March 1996 legislation gradually raises the ex-
empt amount to $30,000 by 2002. Beneficiaries aged 62-64 face a 50-
percent tax rate for earnings above $8,280. Further easing of the earnings
test does not appear on the horizon. The principal argument made
against any such move is the consequent fiscal squeeze. However, it
does not appear to be well understood that much of the lost revenue
would be compensated over the medium run because of other rules
involving the impact of the earnings test on future benefits. Meanwhile,
beginning in 2000 the earnings test wifi grow more restrictive, as the
tighter earnings test for 62-64-year-olds is extended to 65- and 66-year-
olds as the normal retirement age slowly rises.
In spite of the substantial popular attention to the earnings test, it is
no longer clear what role it plays in influencing the labor supply of the
elderly. The increases in the exempt amount might mean the earnings
test no longer leads people to retire, as long as they can freely work and
earn less than the exempt amount. Nevertheless, the earnings test
should continue to affect the choice of hours among those who do work.
Recent research provides little insight about the hours elasticities of the
working elderly, but does conclude that the earnings test has little im-
pact on labor supply. While the econometric modeling in that literature
has often been highly sophisticated, two major problems arise with the
databased principally on information from the 1970s, they have be-
come outdated, and they cover a time period when there were no signifi-
cant changes in the earnings-test rules. With no policy changes shifting
the incentives people face, the econometric estimates depend solely on
how hours of work are correlated with the variation in wages and in-
come across individuals. Differences across individuals in wages and
income are likely to be correlated with the other determinants of labor
supply, however. This identification problem makes it hard to pinpoint
the impact of the earnings test.3
To isolate the role of the earnings test, I focus on several recent
changes in the earnings test rules. Observing the corresponding changes
in labor supply tells us about the effect of the earnings test and also
about the behavior of the working elderly more broadly. However, if
other factors are shifting at the same time, it might not be so simple to
attribute the change in labor supply to the earnings test. Another feature
Similar problems emerge in efforts to determine the impact of social security on retirement.124Friedberg
of the rule changes is that they applied only to certain beneficiaries,
depending on their age. The availability of similar comparison groups
that experienced no changes in the earnings test sets the stage for a
natural-experiment analysis of the sort recently used to study other so-
cial insurance programs and tax changes.4
Even though a strong response to the earnings test emerges in the raw
data, it only reveals part of the earnings test's effect. An econometric
model of labor supply, described in detail in Friedberg (1997), incorpo-
rates the entire range of beneficiaries' responses. This type of structural
estimation is typically faulted for overlooking identification and for im-
posing assumptions on the data that drive the estimates. The aim here is
to extend the natural experiment approach by focusing on one of the
major changes in the earnings-test rules, which leads to substantial varia-
lion in the net wage and income both cross-sectionally and over time.
The resulting estimates indicate a relatively strong effect of income
and especially the net wage on hours of work, which implies substantial
deadweight loss from the earnings test. The estimates are also used to
predict the response to other earnings test changes, such as raising the
exempt amount or eliminating the earnings test entirely. They are of
more general interest in describing the labor supply choices of the el-
derly who continue to work, in contrast to the general focus in the
literature on retirement. It wifi be important to keep in mind the appar-
ent sensitivity of older workers to tax and transfer rules conditional on
working, which will affect the outcome of policies that attempt to reduce
the burden on social security by inducing people to work longer. Further-
more, the results suggest a potentially severe negative effect on labor
supply if benefits start to be means-tested.
The rest of this paper is divided into four sections. Section 2 describes
how the earnings test functions and how it has changed over time. It
also discusses another important set of rulesthe actuarial adjustment
and the delayed retirement creditwhich raise future benefits for cur-
rent benefits forgone to the earnings test. These credits reduce the fiscal
revenues from the earnings test over the long run, and might, but do not
appear to, reduce the labor supply distortions from the earnings test.
Section 3 illustrates the theoretical impact of the earnings test and the
shifts in the earnings-test rules. It shows why the overall effect on labor
supply of easing or eliminating the earnings test is ambiguous, but it
also distinguishes clear predictions about the labor supply response.
Recent studies of natural experimentsa term used to describe policy changes that affect
otherwise similar people in different waysinclude Meyer (1995) on unemployment insur-
ance, Eissa (1995) on income taxes, and Yelowitz (1995) on Medicaid.The Earnings Test and Labor Supply125
Section 4 turns to the data, beginning with information on how many
people lose benefits to the earnings test. It then explores patterns of
earnings across age groups and over time, which reveals unambiguous
responses to the earnings test rules changes. Finally, Section 4 describes
the econometric estimation of a more structured labor supply model that
permits forecasts of the responses to future potential changes in the
earnings-test rules. Section 5 concludes.
2. THE EARNINGS TEST
This section describes how the earnings test functions now and how it
has been altered over time. It also discusses how other rules eliminate
much of the long-term fiscal revenue from the earnings test.
Once a social security beneficiary earns more than a certain amount,
his (or her) benefits are reduced at a rate proportional to additional
earnings. The benefit reduction rate is equivalent to a tax applied to
wages until benefits are gone. In 1996 a beneficiary aged 62-64 could
earn up to $8,280the earnings exempt amountwith no reduction in
benefits. If he works more, he loses $1 in benefits for every $2 he earns
a 50-percent tax rate. For 65-69-year-olds, the earnings test was less
restrictive in 1996, with $12,500 in exempted earnings allowed and a 33-
percent tax rate.5
Table 1 describes how the earnings test has functioned over time, and
Table 2 lists the changes in the earnings test. Until the early 1970s the tax
rate was changed most often. Before 1960 the tax rate was infinite, with
all benefits lost at the point when earnings passed the threshold
amount. Since then the tax rate has been lowered to 33 percent for 65-
69-year-olds and 50 percent for 62-64-year-olds. More recently the ex-
empt amount has been raised for older beneficiaries. In 1976 the exempt
amount was $7,611 (in 1996 dollars) for everyone subject to the earnings
test. It was increased about 25 percent in 1978 for those aged 65 and
over, had reached $11,500 in early 1996, and is now set to rise in steps to
$30,000 in 2002.6 In contrast, the earnings test has remained almost
unchanged for 62-64-year-olds since 1973. A final set of changes has
exempted the oldest beneficiaries from the earnings testbeneficiaries
aged 72 and over in 1951 and aged 70 and 71 in 1983.
The earnings test applies to labor income: wages, salaries, and income from self-
employment.
6 The exempt amount for 65-69-year-olds was raised to $12,500 in 1996, will rise by $1,000
each year through 1999, and then goes to $17,000 in 2000, $25,000 in 2001, and $30,000 in
2002. The exempt amount for 62-64-year-olds is raised yearly according to average earn-
ings increases.126Fried berg
TABLE 1
The Earnings Test Rules over Time(a)
(a)Exempt amounts expressed in 1996 dollars, inflated using the Consumer Price Index.
(b)Before 1954, people aged 72-74 were also subject to the earnings test, and before 1950 people aged
75+ were.
Source: Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, Table 2.A29.
TABLE 2
Changes in the Earnings Test Rules
Source: Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, Table 2.A.29.
Year
62-64-year-olds 65-69-year-olds 70-71-year- oIds)
Exempt Tax Exempt
amount ($)rate (%)amount ($)
Tax Exempt Tax












amount ($) rate (%)
Next earnings Tax
threshold ($) rate (%)
5,977 50 8,468 100
1955
1945
Exempt amount, monthly ($) Tax
472 (5,659 annualized)
101 (1,215 annualized)
Entire month's benefits are lost






2000+ Earnings test rules for 62-64-year-olds ex-
tended to 65-66-year-olds as the normal
retirement age rises from 65 to 67.
65-66 62-64,
67-69
1996 Exempt amount rises to $30,000 in 2002 65-69 62-64
1990 Tax rate lowered to 33% 65-69 62-64
1983 Earnings test eliminated 70-71 62-69
1978 Exempt amount raised 25%; additional in-
creases scheduled through 1982
65-71 62-64
1972 100% tax rate eliminated; pegged annual in-
creases in exempt amount to inflation
All ages-
1961,5,7Exempt amount raised All ages-
1960 50 and 100% tax rates established, instead
of complete loss of benefits
All ages-
1950,2,4,8Raised exempt amount All ages-
1950,4 Eliminated the earnings test 75+,
72-74
62-71The Earnings Test and Labor Supply127
TABLE 3
Impact of the Earnings Test on Future Benefits
Forgo a year of benefits now, and future benefits are raised by
Aged 62-64 Aged 65-69
Since year(actuarial adjustment) (delayed retirement credit)
1990 6% every other year until it reaches 8%
1982 6% 3%
1972 6% 1%, if benefits have not been actuarially
reduced
1961 6% No increase
Source: Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social Security Bulletin, Table 2.A.20.
Another set of rules, described in Table 3, governs the relationship
between the earnings test and future benefits. Just as people are re-
warded with higher benefits in the future if they delay claiming benefits
today, beneficiaries also receive an increase in all future benefits for
current benefits lost to the earnings test.7 For beneficiaries under the age
of 65 this feature is called the actuarial adjustment and amounts to a 6-
percent increase in future benefits for each year's worth of benefits for-
gone. For beneficiaries aged 65-69 the adjustment is called the delayed
retirement credit; it was introduced in 1973 at 1 percent and beginning in
1990 is being raised very gradually to 8 percent. These credits establish a
tradeoff between a year's worth of benefits at present and a percentage
increase in all future benefits.
These credits cancel out the fiscal gains from the earnings test. When
benefits are reduced today, higher payouts are generated in the future.
A 7-8-percent credit is intended to be actuarially fair on average, mean-
ing that the present value of the increased benefits over the rest of the
lifetime roughly equals the benefits lost today, across the whole popula-
tion.8 Therefore, the net fiscal gain from the earnings test over the
medium run is approaching zero as the delayed retirement credit is
raised. Similarly, as Honig and Reimers (1989) pointed out, the fiscal
cost of eliminating the earnings test, though high at the outset, would
gradually be offset because benefits would not rise in the future for
Beneficiaries are compensated if they lose a full month's worth of benefits.
8Coile, Diamond, Gruber, and Jousten (1997) used simulations to show that the actuarial
adjustment is actuarially fair or better than fair for most retirees, especially when the
annuity value of social security is taken into account. If the annuity value is ignored, then
claiming benefits at age 62 is better for some people who are single, have short life expec-
tancy, and/or have very low wealth.128Fried berg
beneficiaries who otherwise would be losing benefits to the earnings
test today.9
Similarly, the dynamic structure of benefits should limit the current
effect of the earnings test on labor supply. Someone who perceives the
credit to be actuarially fair would be indifferent between receiving the
benefit today and receiving the higher stream of benefits over the rest of
his expected lifetime. Even if the credits are not thought to be actuarially
fairand the delayed retirement credit is only slowly approaching actu-
arial fairnessit should stifi make beneficiaries less sensitive to the earn-
ings test.
There is no evidence that the credits are taken into account with re-
gards to the earnings test, however. A number of reasons for this are
possible. People might be unaware that the credits have anything to do
with the earnings testwhen both Money and the Los Angeles Times
recently discussed the earnings test rules, they did not mention that
higher future benefits compensate for current benefits lost to the earn-
ings test.10 The credits might also be ignored because people are myopic,
meaning they place little or no value on getting higher income in the
future for income forgone today.1' Assuming perfect foresight, the effect
of the credits still depends on how much people weigh current versus
future income, which is a function of their ability to borrow against
future income as well as their life expectancy. Even an actuarially fair
credit wifi not be attractive to someone who faces borrowing constraints.
Borrowing-constrained people cannot access the higher future income
today. If they postpone receiving benefits, their consumption today wifi
be too low and their consumption in the future too high relative to the
optimal levels. In sum, short life expectancy, ignorance, myopia, and
borrowing constraints can all prevent the actuarial adjustment and de-
layed retirement credit from reducing the impact of the earnings test.
Previous research on the credits does not shed much light on these
issues. The actuarial adjustment does appear to have some impact on the
timing of claiming benefits, but much less than predicted. Among eligi-
ble men retiring before the age of 62 in the 1982 New Beneficiary Survey,
the age of claiming was associated with some of the factors that raise the
value of the actuarial adjustment, according to Coile, Diamond, Gruber,
Poterba (1997) describes a similar policy where the long-term costs are overestimated.
The estimated tax expenditures from tax-deductible pension and retirement saving contri-
butions ignore the taxes that will be paid when the assets are drawn down in the future.
10Simon (1996) and Kristof (1997).
11Evidence that a significant proportion of the population act myopically in their consump-
tion and savings patterns goes as far back as Flavin (1981).The Earnings Test and Labor Supply129
and Jousten (1997). Nonetheless, about three-quarters claimed benefits
immediately upon turning 62, although simulations suggested it would
be optimal for most people to wait until 65. Reimers and Honig (1993,
1996) investigated the sensitivity of labor-force re-entry to the earnings
test and the credits. They found that the influence of the exempt amount
on re-entry by male retirees did not differ for those under or over the age
of 65, although it should have if people took the credits into account.
In the formal modeling in Friedburg (1997) I take the view that the
credits adjusting future benefits do not affect labor supply decisions. The
influence of the earnings test wifi be demonstrated later in this paper
and belies the impact of the credits. I tried estimating a model of the
earnings test capturing the effect of the delayed retirement credit, but no
such effect emerged. As the estimation results and simulations are dis-
cussed, it will be important to keep in mind the apparent distortions to
current labor supply from the earnings test, along with the diminishing
fiscal benefits over the medium run.
3. HOW THE EARNINGS TEST SHOULD AFFECT
LABOR SUPPLY
This section discusses how the earnings test shifts the incentives people
face. Its impact on the choice of how much to work depends on how
much one would work without the earnings test and may be positive or
negative. Its potential impact on retirement itself depends on whether
the choice of hours can be made with full flexibility or not.
3.1 The Earnings Test and Budget Constraints
The earnings test alters the incentive to work by changing the net wage
and total income of beneficiaries, depending on how much a beneficiary
works. The impact of the earnings test can be understood by graphing
the budget constraint which the earnings test generates. Budget con-
straints demonstrate the tradeoff between two things which people
value: time for leisure and earnings for consumption. A person chooses
how much leisure to give up in order to have higher income, with the
terms of that tradeoff governed by wages and taxes. The horizontal axis
in Figure 1 measures hours of leisure, and as the person moves left
towards the origin he works more and enjoys less leisure time. The
vertical axis measures annual income.12 The person may be endowed
12 The diagram has been simplified by assuming no other sources of income besides social
security and earnings and by abstracting from income taxes, which generate additional







FIGURE 1. The Budget Constraint
with some amount of non-labor income and get additional income only
by working and sacrificing leisure.
The bold segments in Figure 1 illustrate how social security shapes the
budget constraint. A person decides both whether and how much to
work depending on his hourly wage rate w, the size of his benefit B, and
his preferences over consumption relative to leisure. When the person
does not work, he enjoys the maximum hours of leisure available and
has income B. If he works H hours, his income rises by wH, so the wage
measures the return for an hour of work and determines the slope of the
budget constraint. The earnings test changes the net wage once earnings
exceed the exempt amount X. If the person earns another dollar above
X, his benefits shrink. For someone aged 62-64, benefits are reduced by
50 cents, and total income only rises by 50 cents. Working another hour
at wage w raises net income by w, as illustrated in Figure 1. For someone
aged 65-69, working another hour raises net income by w. The abrupt
decline in the net wage generates a kink in the budget constraint. At the
kink, a person is on the margin between two different net wages: if he
works an hour less he still gets w, but if he works an hours more he gets
fr as the slope of the budget constraint flattens out. After all of some-
one's benefits have been taxed away, the net wage returns to w along the
upper segment of the budget constraint.
The social security benefit expands the budget constraint, therefore.
The earnings test further alters the budget constraint and changes incen-
tives in two distinct ways. Intuitively, one expects that people work less
exempt amount (X)
hours of workhours of leisure
(H) riseThe Earnings Test and Labor Supply131
when work is taxed. This incentive to substitute leisure for work is known
as the substitution effectand is quite large when the tax rate is 33 or 50
percent. In addition, the earnings test makes people poorer by reducing
their total income for a given amount of work. This negative income effect
may actually lead people to work more. The substitution and income
effects work in contrary directions, making the overall impact of the earn-
ings test ambiguous. Some people work less because of the earnings-test
tax, but others might work more because of the loss in income, depending
on their relative sensitivity to the substitution and income effects.
These conflicting effects make it difficult to determine from raw data
on beneficiaries' labor supply how much they respond to the earnings
test. Nonetheless, a strong and unambiguous prediction about behavior
emergesthe earnings test should lead some beneficiaries to keep their
earnings just at or below the exempt amount. Earning slightly more, a
person would suddenly face a 33- or 50-percent tax rate. If we see benefi-
ciaries with earnings bunched just at the kink in the budget constraint, it
is a signal that the earnings test does affect labor supply. There is no
other reason to observe people clustered together with a particular level
of earnings, since the earnings distribution is otherwise fairly smooth. If
we do not observe bunching at the exempt amount, then there is not
likely to be any reaction to the earnings test by others.
3.2 Changes in the Earnings Test Rules
How would we expect people to respond if the earnings test is elimi-
nated? As the dashed line in Figure 1 demonstrates, getting rid of the
earnings test removes the kink in the budget constraint and the conse-
quent substitution effect that deterred work. Those who kept their labor
supply just at the kink, earning just up to the exempt amount, wifi now
choose to work more at the higher net wage. However, those already
working more are now better off, and this income effect has a contrary
impact discouraging work. The more a person initially worked and lost
benefits, the stronger the income effect is. For someone who lost some
but not all their benefits, the net wage and total income both rise; labor
supply might rise or fall, depending on their relative sensitivity to the
substitution and income effects. Someone who previously worked too
much to get any benefits now receives benefits, with no change in the
net wage. For them, the income effect alone operates to lower labor
supply. The direction of the income and substitution effects and the
overall change in labor supply depend, therefore, on how much some-
one was initially working, as demonstrated in Table 4.
Less radical changes in the earnings test also change labor supply incen-
tives. In 1990 the tax rate for 65-69-year-olds was reduced from 50 to 33132Fried berg
TABLE 4
Predicted Labor Supply Responses to Earnings Test Changes
Direction of response
Lower At the kink(') Middle segment(a> Upper segment(')
sec,ment(a> Earnings Sub.Inc.Over-Sub.Inc.Over-Sub.Inc.Over-
test changeOver-alleffect effectalleffecteffectalleffect effectall
EarningsNo effectt Not t orNone
test is effect
eliminated
Tax rateNo effect Not tlessI lessor II for some, no ef-
falls effect fect for most
Exempt No effectI NoI I forI I or II for some, no ef-
amount effect some fect for most
rises
(')Initial location on the budget constraint.
Notes:The arrows represent the direction of the impact on labor supply of the substitution and income
effects that result from particular changes in the earnings test rules. The substitution and income
effects depend on where someone is initially located on the budget constraint that is illustrated in
Figure 1.
percent, altering the budget constraint as in Figure 2. The middle segment
becomes steeper, reflecting the greater reward to work. Some people who
were keeping their earnings just below the exempt amount will now work
more because of the substitution effect. On the other hand, people who
were already losing some benefits now have more income and might
work more or less. Some people who were working too much to get
benefits now keep some benefits and face a 33-percent tax rate, and both
effects combined will lead them to work less. Lastly, others working a lot
are unaffected by the changes. Overall, the impact on labor supply of
lowering the tax rate is ambiguous. The strongest prediction arises once
again for those at the kink in the budget constraint: some people with
earnings at the exempt amount will increase their labor supply.
In 1978 and 1996 the exempt amount was raised for those aged 65 and
over. Figure 3 illustrates the resulting change in the budget constraint. Rais-
ing the exemptamountwffl unambiguously raise the labor supply and earn-
ings of people bunched at the exempt amount. The positive substitution
effect is also felt by some beneficiaries working only a little above the ex-
empt amount. For most beneficiaries working more than the exempt
amount, there is no substitution effect encouraging work, while the posi-










FIGURE 3. Raising the Exempt Amount
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3.3 The Earnings Test Can Affect Retirement Too
The analysis above implies that the earnings test wifi not influence the
decision of whether to work or retire. Someone on the margin of choos-
ing whether to work would not be affected by the earnings test, because
his first several thousand dollars of earnings are exempted. The earnings
test would only affect the decision of how much to work conditional on
wanting to work and earn more than the exempt amount. However,
evidence from studies on prime-age workers suggests various reasons
why the budget constraint may not be continuous, as drawn in the
previous section. For instance, minimum hours requirements or fixed
costs of workwhich create discontinuities in the budget constraint at
zero hourswill link the decision of how much to work with the deci-
sion of whether to work at all.13 In that case, the presence of the earnings
test will lead some people to retire.
For example, suppose that firms require their employees to work a
minimum number of hours. Workers might be less productive if they
only worked a few hours, or there might be fixed costs of employing
people. If there are minimum-hours requirements, say H1 or H2 in Figure
4, then the lowest section of the budget constraint is not available. Some-
one who would prefer working a small number of hours must choose
between not working and working the minimum required. If minimum
hours are H1, yielding earnings below the exempt amount, then the
earnings test still does not affect the decision whether to work. How-
ever, if minimum hours are ''2, then some people who would have
chosen to work H2 or less without the earnings test wifi choose not to
work rather than work and lose benefits.
Another kind of discontinuity at zero hours arises if people face fixed
costs of working, as illustrated in Figure 4for example, the cost of
transportation or work clothing. In that case, a person wifi choose not to
work unless his earnings are high enough to pay at least for the cost of
working, which effectively eliminates the lowest part of the budget con-
straint. The higher the fixed costs of work, the more the earnings test
wifi deter work altogether because net income after the earnings test wifi
not cover costs.
If the budget constraint is discontinuous at zero hours, therefore, the
earnings test wifi keep some people from working at all, and changes in
the earnings test will alter retirement rates. Any move to liberalize the
13 Evidence from Hausman (1980), Cogan (1981), and Blank (1988) implies significant fixed
costs of work. Card (1990) found evidence consistent with minimum-hours constraints;
Altonji and Paxson (1988) documented the inflexibility of work schedules.income
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exempt amount
fixed cost of work
H2 H1 hours of leisure
FIGURE 4. A Discontinuous Budget Constraint
earnings testeither raising the exempt amount or lowering the tax
ratewill reduce retirement rates.
It should also be noted that other sources of rigidities in labor supply
or labor demand might generate discontinuities along the rest of the
budget constraint. For whatever reason, hours might be inflexible up-
ward or downward at some jobs. People in those jobs could not respond
to the earnings test, even if they wished to. On the other hand, if the
earnings test is constraining enough, then the response will be more
powerfulthe person can leave the job entirely, either to find a new job
with more suitable hours, which might also involve a lower wage, or to
withdraw from the labor force, as described above.
There is little evidence about the flexibility of choices for the working
elderly over whether to work or how many hours to work. Hours of
work are more variable among the elderly, and part-time work is more
prevalent. Moreover, the flexible reaction to changes in the earnings
test, demonstrated in the next section, makes it clear that some workers
do not face difficulties in adjusting their hours. Still, it wifi be important
to keep in mind this potential source of rigidity in labor supply that may
either mute the response to the earnings test or make it stronger than
expected by inducing people to leave their jobs.
4. EVIDENCE ON THE EARNINGS TEST'S IMPACT
Section 3 illustrated theoretical predictions about the earnings test's im-
pact; this section presents evidence about how social security beneficia-
B+X
B136Fried berg
ries respond to the earnings test. It focuses first on the number of people
on different parts of the budget constraint. A brief reviewof the earlier
literature on the earnings test follows. Then, I present data on earnings
distributions and the degree of bunching at the exempt amount
behavior which can be attributed unambiguously to the earnings test. I
also show how the bunching responds to changes in the earnings test
rules. After finding strong evidence in the raw data, I discuss estimates
of an econometric model of labor supply which incorporates the entire
budget constraint generated by the earnings test. The estimates allow
predictions about the response to possible future changes like the elimi-
nation of the earnings test or an increase in the exempt amount.
4.1 How Many Are Affected
The number of people affected by the earnings test gives a preliminary
indication of its importance. Table 5 summarizes, data from the Social
Security Bulletin. Of 9.8 million retired-worker beneficiaries aged 62-69 in
1989, about 926,000 lost some of all of their benefits to the earnings test.
Particularly affected are 65-69 year olds-757,560 beneficiaries suffered
a reduction in benefits, representing 10.5 percentof the total and 38.3
percent of working beneficiaries. Estimates also suggest there were
173,700 65-69-year-old beneficiaries in the immediate vicinity of the kink
in the budget constraint and 582,000 eligibles with earnings who did not
claim benefits and should be located on the upper segment of the budget
TABLE 5
Number of People Affected by the Ear,zings Test, 1989
Aged 65-69
(a)Bondar, Social Security Bulletin, 1993.
(")Leonesio, Social Security Bulletin, 1990
Number of retired worker beneficiaries0' 7,229,512





had earnings within 90-110% of exempt amount0' 173,700
Number who have not claimed benefits and stifi work0') 582,000
Aged 62-64
Number of retired worker beneficiaries(a) 2,549,084
who work and had benefits withheld(a) 168,782
Total, beneficiaries who had benefits withheld 926,342The Earnings Test and Labor Supply137
constraint in Figure 1. Therefore, with over one-third of working 65-69-
year-olds losing benefits to the earnings test and hundreds of thousands
more affected as well, it appears that the earnings test could have a
potentially important impact on labor supply.
4.2 Previous Research on the Earnings Test
With so many working beneficiaries affected by the earnings test, it is
not surprising that the earnings test receives substantial popular atten-
tion. In the New Beneficiary Survey of 1982, 73 percent of retirees under
age 72 said they knew of the earnings test.14 Magazines like Money and
AARP's Modern Maturity regularly feature information about the earn-
ings test. The 1989 study Paying People Not to Work (Robbins and Rob-
bins, 1989), while flawed, was widely cited in the media.15 Concern over
the distortions induced by the earnings test spurred Congress to raise
the exempt amount in 1996 for 65-69-year-olds.
Nevertheless, the previous scholarly literature on the earnings test
generally dismissed its importance. One argument made in several previ-
ous papers is that the earnings test is unimportant because it does not
affect many people. This view was expressed in several articles in the
Social Security Bulletin and also by Burtless and Moffitt (1985).16 They
argued that a small percentage of the elderly are affected by the earnings
test. However, the data in Table 5 make it clear that a large percentage of
working beneficiaries are affected.
The most thorough papers to date, by Burtless and Moffitt (1985) and
Gustman and Steinmeier (1986), incorporated the effect of the earnings
test into joint models of retirement and post-retirement labor supply.
The post-retirement hours choice was modeled using the budget con-
straint illustrated in Section 3. Each paper used the Retirement History
Survey, a rich longitudinal survey that lasted from 1969 to 1979, but with
a major weakness for studying the earnings test. During that time period
beneficiaries of all ages faced the same earnings test parameters, with a
single minor change in the rules over time.17 Thus, variation across
14Reported in Leonesio (1990).
15Leonesio (1990) noted "serious theoretical and methodological shortcomings of their
work," which led to the conclusion that 700,000 more of the elderly would return to work if
the earnings test were eliminated.
16Bondar (1993), Leonesio (1990), Packard (1990), Lingg (1986).
The 1972 change in the earnings test, noted in Table 2, eliminated a 100-percent tax rate
for earnings past a second threshold above the exempt amount. However, the 1972 change
is less useful than later ones for identifying the reaction to the earnings test. It applied to
beneficiaries of all ages, yielding no natural comparison group to control for time-series
changesparticularly critical at that juncture because retirement rates were rising sharply.138Fried berg
people in the shape of the budget constraintwhich drives the labor-
supply estimatesarises not because of changes in external policy, but
because of variation across people in the net wage and non-labor in-
come. However, the net wage and non-labor income not only shape the
budget constraint, but might also be correlated with other determinants
of labor supply. For instance, a person's past history of productivity and
labor supply might be correlated with the present wage and probably
also with present labor supply. Past earnings determine present social
security and pension benefits. This joint causation creates an identfica-
tion problemestimates of the substitution and income elasticities end
up reflecting other factors that affect labor supply as well. As a result,
the estimates do not convey an accurate picture of the response to the
earnings test.
In contrast to previous work on the earnings test, the empirical analy-
sis in this paper is centered on periods before and after changes in the
earnings test rules. Changes in the exempt amount and the tax rate cause
major changes in the net wage and non-labor income which shift the
budget constraint. This source of variation is independent of individual
level determinants of labor supply and offers a way around the identifica-
tion problem. It might still be difficult to pinpoint the earnings test's
effect if other changes in labor supply were occurring over a similar time
period. However, each of the recent rule changes applied to beneficiaries
of one age group and not others. The unaffected age groups form a
natural comparison group to control for other changes in labor supply
behavior, by comparing the change in labor supply for the affected group
with the labor supply over the same time period of the unaffected group.
4.3 How People React to the Earnings Test
Empirical strategies for evaluating the effect of tax policies on labor sup-
ply vary in the degree to which they formalize individual behavior: the
more structured the approach, the more closely the conclusions resem-
ble theoretical concepts of interest, but also the more the accuracy of the
conclusions depends on the formalization itself being a good description
of reality.
I present two distinct approaches to this question. In order to focus on
the strongest theoretical implication, this subsection analyzes earnings
Also, there was no apparent reaction to the second kink in the budget constraint or to its
elimination. While that bounds the potential responsiveness of beneficiaries to the earn-
ings test, it nevertheless remains consistent with a strong reaction to the initial kink, as
estimated here. For any given reaction at the initial kink, the propensity of beneficiaries to
locate at the higher kink is smaller because of its proximity to the reverse kink in the budget
constraint where all benefits disappear, which people tend to avoid.The Earnings Test and Labor Supply139
patterns relative to the earnings exempt amount. Comparing earnings
before and after the rule changes decomposes how people respond to
the exempt amount and to the tax rate, while comparing their response
with that of other unaffected groups over time controls for aggregate
trends which also move the earnings distribution. However, capturing
the responses of people along other parts of the budget constraint, and
quantifying those responses in terms of income and substitution effects,
will require a more structured framework. The next subsection will dis-
cuss estimates from a model that incorporates the entire budget con-
straint illustrated in Figure 1 into a model of labor supply.
Figures 5AC begin by showing earnings distributions relative to the
exempt amount before and after the exempt amount was raised for 65-71-
year-olds in 1978. Using data from March Current Population Surveys
(CPS), the graphs compare the earnings in the previous year of 67-69-
year-old men and 63-64-year-old men, who did not experience any
change in the exempt amount. Figure 5-A shows, before 1978, how
many of the older and the younger group had earnings in each $1000
interval abdve and below the kink in the budget constraint defined by
the exempt amount, as a proportion of the total number of people in the
age group.18'19
Figure 5-A demonstrates a strong response to the kink in the budget
constraint generated by the exempt amount. People in both age groups
bunch just at or below the kinkover 20 percent of 67-69-year-old
workers have earnings within $1000 below the kink, along with almost
10 percent of 63-64-year-old workers. Roughly the same number of
people appear fri each increment for several steps below the kink, fol-
lowed by a big drop in the step from just below to just above the kink.
The visible reaction to the earnings test contrasts with earlier conclusions
that the earnings test has little effect.
After 1978, the cluster of 67-69-year-olds moves up to the new exempt
amount. Figure 5-B shows earnings of both age groups in relation to the
18The figures show earnings from wages and salaries plus earnings from self-employment,
which is what the earnings test counts. The age groups were narrowed because the CPS
reports age in March following the working year, instead of exact birthdays. The sample is
restricted to men because spousal benefits are complicated by the choice of receiving
benefits as a dependent or as a retiree. Dependent benefits are earnings tested on both the
retiree's and the dependent's earnings, while retiree benefits are earnings tested only on
the retiree's earnings. The type of benefit a spouse receives is not reported in the CPS.
19While the theory predicts a cluster exactly at the exempt amount, measurement error or
small rigidities in labor supply wifi plausibly spread out the cluster in the neighborhood of
or just below the exempt amount. The interval width of $1000 was chosen because respon-
dents tend to round off reported earnings to the nearest thousand, so a different interval
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unchanged exempt amount of the younger group. The 63-64-year-olds
cluster just below it as before, but the earnings of 67-69-year-olds have
clearly shifted upwards. Figure 5-C shows them bunching at their new
higher kink. Quantifying the visual evidence allows conclusions about
statistical significance, as reported in Friedberg (1997). The bunching at
the exempt amount is statistically different from the behavior along
other parts of the budget constraint, and the shift in the bunching is
statistically significant as well. Together, the visual and statistical evi-
dence confirms that a significant number of people react to the earnings
test by limiting their earnings.
Figures 6AD make the same comparisons of earnings around the
exempt amount before and after 1983, when the earnings test was elimi-
nated for 70-71-year-olds. Figures 6-A and 6-B illustrate earnings pat-
terns before 1983.20 Figure 6-A compares the earnings of the affected
group with that of a younger group that faces the earnings test both
before and after 1983. The clustering at the exempt amount by those of
both ages is, again, substantial. Figure 6-B gives a sense of the coun-
terf actual by comparing the affected group with an older group of 73-75-
year-olds who do not face the earnings test and whose earnings decline
smoothly over the same range. Figures 6-C and 6-D make the same
comparisons after 1983. Now, the earnings of the affected 71-72-year-
olds decline smoothly over the range of the earnings kink in resem-
blance of the older group, while the younger group continues to bunch
at the exempt amount.
The analysis concludes with Figures 7AB, focusing on the 1990 de-
cline in the tax rate from 50 to 33 percent for 65-69-year-olds. Figure 7-A
shows earnings of 63-64- and 67-69-year-olds before 1990, and Figure 7-
B shows earnings after 1990. In both, we see the familiar piling up at the
exempt amount. Yet, comparing the graphs, it is difficult to detect a
change in the degree of bunching by the older group relative to the
younger. While the lack of reaction places a bound on the underlying
responsiveness of labor supply, it need not contradict the evidence of
strong reactions to the other changes.21 The 17-percentage-point decline
in the tax rate represents a smaller change than the earlier ones, when
the tax rate went to zero. Furthermore, though it makes sense for psycho-
logical rather than economic reasons, people might act to avoid all high
20 Figure 6 actually shows 71-72-year-olds, since they were 70-71 when the earnings were
earned. 1982 is omitted because the change had been scheduled to occur in 1982 but was
postponed in 1981 for one year.
21 The estimates in Friedberg (1997) do imply a slight decline in hours resulting from the
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exempt
amt
Earnings in $1000 intervals relative to
the exempt amount




Earnings in $1000 intervals relative to
the exempt amount
Age 63-64 Age 67-69
FIGURE 7. Earnings Distributions Before and After 1990
tax rates, instead of distinguishing precisely how high the tax rate is. In
sum, the earnings patterns demonstrate substantial bunching of benefi-
ciaries at the exempt amount, along with considerable responsiveness to
the shifts in the budget constraint when the earnings test rules change.




4.4 Results from a Model of the Earnings Test
This subsection reports estimates and forecasts from an econometric
model of labor supply detailed in Friedberg (1997). The model seeks to
explain the choice of hours of work that maximizes utility subject to the
kinked budget constraint illustrated in Figure 1. The model captures the
bunching at the exempt amount together with reactions along other parts
of the budget constraint which are more difficult to detect in the raw data.
Because of the need to incorporate exogenous variation in the budget
constraint to identify the model estimates, the sample covers the years
before and after the 1983 elimination of the earnings test for 70-71- year-
olds. This strategy introduces substantial variation in the net wage and
virtual income across age groups and over time.
The model yields estimates of the effect of the net wage, non-labor
income, and demographic variables on labor supply. The estimates indi-
cate a strong effect of the wage and non-labor income, especially com-
pared to results from the literature on prime-age workers. This apparent
sensitivity of older workers to wages and taxes is reflected in the flexible
reaction to the earnings test observed in the previous subsection.
Another useful measure of the earnings test's impact is deadweight
loss. Deadweight loss indicates how much a tax distorts the labor supply
of those seeking to avoid the tax, relative to the amount of tax collected
from them. It is measured as
deadweight loss = equivalent variation - tax revenue.
Equivalent variation is the income equivalent of the utility loss that is
caused by the decline in labor supply in response to the earnings test.
Subtracted from equivalent variation is the tax revenue, or benefits lost
to the earnings test, which is society's gain. Deadweight loss therefore
expresses how much social welfare as a whole is lost because of the
earnings test. The more sensitive people are to the net wage, the more
they wifi lower their labor supply to avoid the earnings test, which
shrinks tax revenue and expands deadweight loss.
The model, the sample from the Current Population Survey, and the estimation are
discussed in extensive detail in Friedberg (1997). The estimation results imply an uncom-
pensated substitution elasticity of 0.316 (0.021) and an income elasticity of 0.332 (0.044) at
the sample means.
23An exact measure of equivalent variation is computed using the estimated labor-supply
coefficients according to Hausman (1981). People on the upper segment of the budget
constraint do not suffer deadweight loss from the earnings test, because their net wage is
unchanged; they face only an income effect from the lost benefits, which is a social gain.The Earnings Test and Labor Supply145
The model estimates imply that older workers are quite sensitive to
the net wage, resulting in significant deadweight loss. Table 6 reports
the average deadweight loss estimated for people on different parts of
the budget constraint. For people located on the earnings kink, average
deadweight loss is $947so the loss in utility caused by their efforts to
avoid the earnings test is worth $947 to themand there is no social gain
in the form of reduced benefits collected from them. The average dead-
weight loss for people with labor supply on the middle segment of the
budget constraint, facing a 50-percent tax rate, is $2,365. Their dead-
weight loss equals more than half the average revenue they surrender to
the earnings test of $4,585. Thus, the earnings test imposes very high
welfare losses relative to the fiscal savings it immediately generates.
TABLE 6
Results of the Model
Current effect of the earnings test
Deadweight Benefits lost to
Average for people located: loss ($) earnings test ($)
at the earnings kink $947 $0
on the middle segment $2365 $4585
Predicted impact of changing the earnings-test rules
Assumption Change in average annual hours(a)
Current Benchmark:
exempt amount up 20%, 1782
tax rate 33%
Earnings test eliminated 1876
Change from Benchmark + 5.3%
Exempt amount raised to $30,000 1778
Change from Benchmark 0.2%
Change in average gross earnings ($)
$30,000
(a)For all people located at or above the earnings kink.
Note: Predictions for 65-69-year-olds based on the labor-supply model described in Friedberg (1997).
Lower Earnings Middle Upper
Assumption segment kink segmentsegment
Current Benchmark 3,757 8,758 18,600 43,892
Earnings test eliminated 3,757 13,145 21,983 42,128
Exempt amount raised to 3,757 11,743 19,801 39,457146Fried berg
Moreover, the delayed retirement credit raises benefit payouts in the
future, ultimately boosting deadweight loss further.
The discussion thus far deals with the earnings test in place. Another
goal of estimating a formal model is to be able to predict the impact of
other changes in the earnings test rules. To that end, the estimates were
used to simulate the effect of removing the earnings test for 65-69-year-
olds and the effect of raising their exempt amount to $30,000, which has
been legislated to occur gradually by 2002. The predicted change in labor
supply appears in the middle panel of Table 6. Because the earnings test
has been altered since 1983, the forecasts are compared with those identi-
fied as the Current Benchmark predictions, where the earnings test pa-
rameters have been updated to resemble the rules before the 1996
changes.24 The Benchmark predicts average annual hours of 1,782 for
65-69-year-olds located at or above the kink in the budget constraint.
The most radical reform would eliminate the earnings test entirely.
Removing the earnings test is predicted to raise annual hours for those
currently earning at or above the exempt amount from 1782 to 1876, a
5.3-percent increase. Thus, the positive substitution effect from eliminat-
ing the earnings test dominates in the aggregate. The last panel of Table
6 makes this more explicit by reporting average gross earnings before
and after the simulated changes in the rules, according to people's initial
location on the budget constraint. The substitution effect of eliminating
the earnings test tax for those currently at the earnings kink causes a 51-
percent increase in average earnings, from $8,758 under the Benchmark
to $13,145 without the earnings test. While the negative income effect
from having higher benefits grows along the middle segment, average
earnings are still predicted to rise 18 percent overall, from $18,600 to
$21,983. Lastly, the income effect for those initially on the upper seg-
ment leads their earnings to decline 4 percent, from $43,892 to $42,128.
Nevertheless, the overall effect on hours and earnings of eliminating the
earnings test is strongly positive.
Table 6 also reports the results of simulating the increase in the ex-
empt amount to $30,000. Interestingly, aggregate hours for those at or
above the kink would be virtually unchanged. The breakdown of earn-
ings by initial location gives more insight into this reaction. Average
earnings for those initially on the middle segment rise by only one-third
as much as they would without the earnings test. Furthermore, average
earnings for those on the upper segment fall by 10.1 percent. Along with
24 In 1995, 65-69-year-olds faced a tax rate of 33 percent instead of 50 percent and an
exempt amount about 20 percent higher in real terms. Each of those changes is predicted to
lower hours by less than 1 percent.The Earnings Test and Labor Supply147
the negative income effect for this group, noted earlier, there is a nega-
tive substitution effect from facing the earnings-test tax rate. In sum,
raising the exempt amount removes the burden of the earnings test for
many low earners. However, it makes the earnings test bind for a new
group of high earners, who would lower their labor supply as a result.
One argument made against further liberalizing the earnings test is
the fiscal cost. While the initial cost is high, the medium-run cost is much
smaller and declining.26 As Honig and Reimers (1989) pointed out, the
cost would gradually be offset because the delayed retirement credit
would not be granted to beneficiaries who otherwise would get higher
benefits later when they lose benefits to the earnings test today. At
present, the cumulative fiscal cost of eliminating the earnings test is
diminishing as the delayed retirement credit is increased every other
year. Once the delayed retirement credit becomes fully actuarially fair on
average, the fiscal cost of eliminating the earnings test today will be
virtually canceled out within several years.27
Another possible argument against further liberalizing the earnings test
is that it would primarily benefit high-income beneficiaries. While total in-
come would rise more for high earners, the results also demonstrate that
most of the deadweight loss is currently being borne by low and medium
earners. Their labor supply is more distorted by the earnings test, and
their hours of work would rise the most if the earnings test were lifted.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The earnings test has been the subject of a great deal of popular atten-
tion, but less academic interest, in recent years. This paper revisits the
This result in particular depends on the assumption, discussed at the end of section 3,
that all individuals can adjust their labor supply flexibly. Perhaps those near the kink who
are working relatively little can (and do) adjust their hours, but others who work a lot
might have less flexibility. If the labor supply of people on the upper segment of the
budget constraint were completely inflexible, then the static response to raising the exempt
amount to $30,000 would be less negativeand similarly, the response to eliminating the
earnings test would be more strongly positive. On the other hand, if the incentives become
great enough, people working full time might choose to leave those jobs for others offering
part-time hoursa stronger negative response.
Leonesio (1990) reported Social Security Administration forecasts that eliminating the
earnings test for 65-69-year-olds would raise payouts by $4.3 billion in the first year.
Income, payroll, and benefits taxes due to higher earnings would offset 14.8% of the cost.
The estimates used in the forecasts from Hanoch and Honig (1983) are 0.17 for the uncom-
pensated wage elasticity and virtually zero for the income elasticity. The elasticities esti-
mated here would lead to a larger offset through taxes paid from the boost to labor supply.
The medium-run offset might not be complete due to adverse selection: those with a low
life expectancy will be less constrained to postpone filing for benefits than they were with
the earnings test in place.148Fried berg
evidence on the earnings test using more recent data and a new identifi-
cation strategy. A series of changes in the earnings-test rules over the
last twenty years altered the budget set for beneficiaries of certain ages
and not for those of other ages. Studying the response of those changes
yields several conclusions.
First, the data reveal a substantial number of workers with earnings
clustered just at the earnings exempt amount. The clustering demon-
strates that the earnings test leads some beneficiaries to hold down their
labor supply. The clustering moves when the exempt amount moves,
and disappears when the earnings test is eliminated. Therefore, many
beneficiaries are reacting promptly and flexibly to the earnings test rules.
The behavior around the exempt amount is most noticeable but is not
a complete picture of how the earnings test affects labor supply. An
econometric model of labor supply characterizes the behavior of every-
one affected by the earnings test. The resulting estimates imply substan-
tial deadweight loss from older workers changing their labor supply in
response to taxation. Even so, the model predicts a slight decline in
aggregate labor supply among 65-69-year-olds in response to raising the
exempt amount to $30,000, which has been legislated for the year 2002.
The positive effect on hours for low earners would be offset by a nega-
tive effect for high earners, who would start to face the earnings test tax
rate. On the other hand, the model predicts that eliminating the earn-
ings test would lead people to raise their hours of work by 5.3 percent on
average, with particularly large increases for those with earnings near
the exempt amount. The medium-run cost of eliminating the earnings
test would be much smaller than the immediate cost, because the de-
layed retirement credit would no longer raise future benefits of people
losing them to the earnings test. As the delayed retirement credit be-
comes actuarially fair on average, the medium-run cost approaches zero.
The labor supply estimates also tell us about the labor supply of the
working elderly more generallywhich is a different focus from that of
most of the previous research on the elderly, emphasizing retirement. It
wifi be important to keep in mind the apparent sensitivity of older work-
ers to tax and transfer rules. The environment governing hours choices
conditional on working wifi influence the ultimate success of policies
that aim to reduce the burden on social security and other public pro-
grams by inducing people to work longer and save more. The results
also suggest a potentially severe negative effect on labor supply if bene-
fits start to be means-testeda proposal gaining attention in Congress.
Another important consideration involves younger beneficiaries. Little
attention has been paid to the differential treatment accorded to 62-64-
year-olds, who face an earnings test as restrictive as it was in the mid-The Earnings Test and Labor Supply149
1970s. Since then the median retirement age has slipped from 65 to 62.
The underlying trends towards earlier retirement and earlier exit from
career jobs raise the possibility that 62-64-year-olds have been growing
more sensitive to the earnings test. This issue is of increasing importance
as the normal retirement age begins to be raised in2000 from 65 to 67. The
tighter earnings test for 62-64-year-olds will be extended concurrently to
65- and 66-year-olds. The lengthening time period over which beneficiar-
ies face the more restrictive earnings test will blunt some of the gains from
the recent move to relax the earnings test for older beneficiaries.
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